While business-NGO partnerships have received much attention in recent years, insights have been obtained from research in 'stable' contexts, not from conflict-ridden countries where such collaboration may be even more crucial in building trust and capacity and in addressing governance problems given the absence of a reliable state. This paper aims to shed light on business-NGOs collaboration in a conflict setting, exploring partnership activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Most partnerships found are philanthropic, and deal with 'traditional' issues such as health and education in a donor-recipient mode with limited community involvement. There are only a few real transformative partnerships, which address aspects directly related to the conflict from a wider community focus; these involve extractive companies most exposed via mineral development/production. We also found so-called 'engagement' collaboration which can be divided into activities including the transfer of funds (and characterised by service delivery), and those without funds, focusing on knowledge exchange that furthers companies' awareness of conflict-sensitive issues into their operations. Peculiarities of the different types of partnerships are discussed as well as implications for research and practice.
PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITIES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the potential of cross-sectoral collaboration in tackling societal issues has received considerable attention, from the perspective of both academics (e.g. Austin, 2000; Bäckstrand, 2006; Kolk et al., 2011; Selsky and Parker, 2005, Van Huijstee et al., 2007) and practitioners (recent examples include Horton et al., 2009; Hudson, 2009) . Partnerships are increasingly considered as having the potential to address global problems that one single actor cannot solve, including poverty, development and climate change (e.g. Bäckstrand, 2008; Forsyth, 2007; Kolk et al., 2008; Reed and Reed, 2009 ). However, despite the broad interest, it is noteworthy that this literature is generally situated in relatively stable countries, i.e. conflict settings do not receive specific consideration. While lack of good governance has been related to the emergence of partnerships, given that governments, companies and NGOs are unable to unilaterally achieve desired public objectives (Andanova et al., 2009; Braithwaite and Dahos, 2000; Dahan et al., 2010; Kolk et al., 2008) , the need to fill regulatory gaps is often not placed in the context of (violent) conflict.
On the one hand, a conflict setting further complicates the formation and implementation of partnerships as activities take place in a highly complex and volatile environment, thus requiring an even greater degree of understanding of the specific backgrounds of each partner, as well as their perceptions and expectations, than in more stable countries. On the other hand, it can be argued that in the context of an institutional void, with governance structures in flux, and different groups fighting for scarce resources and/or government power, the role of companies and NGOs, individually but particularly jointly, can be very important to help address issues related to instability and/or conflict. Collaboration can build trust and local capacity, enable learning and exchange, and encourage community involvement, thus creating conditions for peace and rehabilitation. Such a perspective extends recent attention to the role of business in conflict resolution to pay specific attention to their collaborative activities in this regard (cf. Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2009; Oetzel et al., 2007) . In this paper, we will examine business-NGO collaboration in such a conflict setting, exploring partnership activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for a sample of 59 international companies active in this country.
The DRC, situated in the heart of Central Africa, has been ravaged by conflicts in the past decade. Despite formal peace agreements in 2006 and 2008, bouts of violence have continued to occur regularly, especially in the Eastern provinces of Katanga, North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, which has had a devastating impact on the economy. The conflict that began in August 1998 drastically reduced national output and government income, also due to informal activities and illegal exploitation of the country's resources by various local, regional and international economic actors (UN, 2001) . The DRC's enormous wealth of natural resources has been seen as a burden rather than a blessing throughout its history (Hochschild, 1998) . Abundance of valuable resources has benefited a few powerful individuals rather than contributing to the development of many, as poverty is widespread. This is illustrated by figures concerning life expectancy (48 years), mortality of children under 5 (199 per 1,000) and DRC's ranking in the Human Development Index (176 out of the 182 countries) (UN, 2010; World Bank, 2010) . The number of deaths resulting from violence, famine and diseases from August 1998 until April 2007 has been estimated at more than 3.9 million, with over 100,000 people being displaced as a results of fighting since mid-2005 alone, and sexual violence is highly prevalent in the North-eastern part of the country (IRC, 2007, p. ii; MSF, 2005) . The DRC is a clear example of a fragile country trapped in a vicious cycle of conflict, the Eastern provinces.
By exploring collaborative activities with an eye to their potential for contributing to a diminution of conflict and a restoration of trust, our study contributes to the literature on partnerships by adding a different context and (societal) purpose. Moreover, it can help shed some light on debates regarding the (potential) role of business in conflict resolution, and how business can be involved in community development beyond philanthropy (e.g. Bowen et al., 2008; Muthuri, 2008; Muthuri et al., 2009) , where empirical evidence, especially from 'difficult research' settings, has been limited. In the next section, we will pay some attention to existing insights, and how they are approached in this study to create a framework for analysis. This is followed by an explanation of our sample and methodology, a presentation and discussion of findings, and conclusions and implications.
BUSINESS, CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION
In the past decade, attention has increased for the role of business in conflict areas, including the issues that multinational companies (MNCs) face when operating in such contexts, sometimes also highlighting their positive, possibly 'leading-edge' involvement (e.g. Bais and Huijser, 2005; Bennett, 2002; Gerson, 2001; Haufler, 2004; Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2009; Nelson, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007) . MNCs can take individual actions or supplement those undertaken by others (Bennett, 2002; Oetzel et al., 2007) . Looking at types of activities, companies can play a role to address conflict directly (for example, via security arrangements, negotiations or withholding payments) or indirectly via lobbying governments or other relevant actors, or by supporting philanthropic activities (Oetzel et al., 2007) .
How companies react to conflict situations is part of a broader literature on business for peace that has increased in attention in the past decade, as shown by a 2010 issue of Journal of Business Ethics fully dedicated to Peace Through Commerce, and other publications by both academics and practitioners (Fort and Schipani, 2004; International Alert, 2005; Wengler and Mockly, 2003) . 'Business for peace' covers the more generic contributions of business to further the cause of peace regardless of whether they are directly involved in a conflict zone. The business-peace nexus has been examined through various lenses. One has concentrated on business in conflict zones, with a clear emphasis on embracing 'do no harm policies' or implementing codes of conduct or multistakeholder schemes to certify 'conflict' commodities. Another has focused on the role of the private sector in contributing to economic development as a prerequisite for stability and peace, or through studying the role of a particular industry (such as tourism, sports, or mining). Business for peace has been looked at from different disciplines, particularly political science and international relations (Bennett, 2002; Haufler, 2002 Haufler, , 2004 Wolf et al., 2007) , and management, including business ethics and business and society perspectives (e.g. Fort and Schipani, 2004; Nelson, 2000; Warhurst, 2005) . Typically, MNCs' reactions to conflict are determined by a variety of factors such as conflict intensity, geographical location, investment structure, firm size, firm experience, industry, firm type/ownership and stakeholder pressure (Berman, 2000; Oetzel et al., 2007) , but very few empirical studies have been carried out to examine the exact drivers of companies' reaction in a given conflict context. However, while hard evidence and empirical research is lacking, there seems to be consensus about the fact that not all business fosters peace, but that ethical business does (Fort, 2010) .
Strategies that ethical companies can deploy to promote peace can be divided into five main categories (Fort and Schipani, 2004; Oetzel et al., 2010) : promoting economic development, enhancing the rule of law, contributing to a sense of community, engaging in track two diplomacy, or engaging in conflict sensitive practices. Similar models developed in the practitioner-oriented literature (International Alert, 2005; Nelson, 2000) categorized 6 activities that business can carry out to promote peace according to the following channels: core business, i.e. maintain operations to generate wealth and provide jobs (cf. Bais and Huijser, 2005; Fort and Schipani, 2004) ; social investment, i.e. support humanitarian efforts (Gerson and Colletta, 2002) or engage in partnerships that help address the main drivers of conflict, particularly corruption, poverty and social inequality (Bennett, 2002; Nelson, 2000);  or policy dialogue, i.e. engage in track two diplomacy or provide incentives to warring parties to engage in peace talks (Zandvliet, 2005) . A distinction is also made between three strategies: compliance, do no harm and peace building (Nelson, 2000) . Other frameworks have been designed that categorize possible business strategies into direct or indirect influences on the conflict on the one hand, and unilateral or collaborative interventions on the other hand (Oetzel et al., 2007) . These interventions can take place at micro, meso or macro levels, and before, during or after a conflict (International Alert, 2005; Zandvliet, 2005) .
The role of collaborative activities is mentioned very often in relation to conflict, also in co-creating a more sustainable peaceful society. Several publications emphasise the added value for business to engage in partnerships with other actors in (post)conflict settings (e.g. Bais and Huijser, 2005; Haufler, 2002; Haufler and Ballentine, 2005; Kolk and Lenfant, 2009 ), but evidence on such collaboration is very limited. This is partly due to the fact that governments and NGOs have traditionally been seen as quintessential actors with a 'mandate' or responsibility for dealing with peace and conflict issues (Barnes, 2005) . This is in a sense comparable with the broader area of partnerships for development, where public-nonprofit collaboration has had a much longer history than those involving business (Kolk et al., 2008) .
Another factor that may explain the lack of studies is the absence of data about business activities in conflict countries due to the difficult setting and the sensitivities surrounding it, as well as the complexities of collecting information on the ground. Hence, while partnerships have received increasing research attention overall, as outlined in the introduction, this does not apply to partnerships in conflict countries, and even less those in Africa, a region underexposed in research on business and corporate social responsibility more generally, except for Nigeria and South Africa (Kolk and Lenfant, 2009; Kolk and Van Tulder, 2010; Visser, 2006) . The relevance of partnerships involving business in conflict countries in Africa seems high, however, particularly given the often large corporate presence, and their potential impact on creating conditions for a (more) peaceful situation, a likely prerequisite for development, in the context of a governance vacuum and the absence of a clear and reliable regulatory framework. We focus on business-NGO collaboration, in which NGOs often link to or represent broader constituencies, including local communities, a linkage that we explore as well.
In conflict countries, MNCs can learn from NGOs how to operate in conflict prone zones or how to engage with communities in areas where governments have failed to provide them with basis services. NGOs have extensive knowledge of the local context, and engage in a variety of activities with regard to peace building (for example, those that involve early warning, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, service provision and intermediation between various parties) (World Bank, 2006) . Despite criticism on NGOs concerning (in)effectiveness or lack of accountability (e.g. Goodhand, 2006; Uvin, 1999) , their track record in fragile settings is widely recognised (Barnes, 2005) . Typically, publications on business-NGO partnerships in conflict countries emphasise that they should involve more than a provision of funds (Haufler and Ballentine, 2005; World Bank, 1998 ) and move beyond a restricted humanitarian response to a more strategic involvement (Ward, 2004) in order to achieve a greater impact in promoting peace and development. Contributing to sustainable community development can be seen of part of such strategies, which is particularly relevant for MNCs (Ite, 2007; Newell and Frynas, 2007) , also in the context of corporate innovation.
Community-business interaction in Africa has received attention most notably in relation to Nigeria, with studies taking a critical look at oil companies' impact on and engagement strategy with local communities, especially Shell's relationship with the Ogoni communities (Eweje, 2006 (Eweje, , 2007 Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004 Ite, , 2007 Wheeler et al., 2002) . Studies that examined the usefulness, relevance and impact of MNCs' involvement in community development initiatives revealed their inability to integrate community expectations (Eweje, 2006 (Eweje, , 2007 . Improving business-community communication (Idemudia, 2007) and managing community expectations in the context of dysfunctioning governments so as to avoid/diminish conflicts (Eweje, 2006; Garvin et al, 2009; Idemudia and Ite, 2007; Wheeler et al., 2002) is not only relevant in Nigeria, but also in the DRC, a country ranking among the world's weakest in terms of governance (Brookings Institution, 2008) . In such contexts, corporate community engagement activities, such as philanthropy and corporate donations, have been criticized for failing to address the challenges faced by poor communities (Manteaw, 2008; Muthuri, 2008) or tackle the root causes of conflict (Idemudia and Ite, 2006) . Business-led community development initiatives can then do more harm than good and be potentially disruptive (Akpan, 2006; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite 2004 ). In the DRC context, this is compounded by the fact that extractive activities have often had a negative impact due to dislocation, issues surrounding land and property rights, environment degradation and social disruption. In that light, partnerships give MNCs an opportunity to take local needs into account and address relevant issues, including how to reduce conflict and/or further peace and development (cf. Nwankwo et al., 2007) . However, to what extent there is collaboration, what this entails in terms of types and focus on conflict is unclear; this is what will be explored below. Before moving to the empirical study, we will first indicate how we approach partnerships in a conflict setting.
In examining collaborative activities between firms and NGOs in the DRC, we have taken Austin (2000) as starting point, especially his collaboration continuum, with philanthropic on one end, and integrative on the other. However, this model was shown to be difficult to apply even in 'normal or typical' CSR projects (Jamali and Keshishian, 2009) , let alone in conflict settings, where partnerships' objectives often seem much broader, also in community terms, beyond the organisational realms. We have thus adjusted Austin's continuum to be more in line with the specific context, particularly with regard to the 'intermediate', transactional stage. Accordingly, we consider philanthropy as similar to Austin (2000) , in that it is a charitable activity with a donor and a recipient, and "low levels of corporate-community interaction" (Muthuri, 2008, p. 185) . This is comparable to the traditional approach towards community participation as noted by Muthuri et al. (2009) , and the transactional type distinguished by Bowen et al. (2008) .
Different from Austin (2000) , but more in line with the developmental period of Muthuri et al. (2009) , we have 'relabelled' transactional to 'engagement', in the sense that there is community-company or company-NGO interaction, exchange of knowledge and information, often organized as a platform, but not necessarily involving transfer of funds. We made a distinction between engagement with funds (i.e. involving a service delivery element, with a learning component, yet no broad community impact) and engagement without funds, i.e. engagement exclusively based on an exchange of knowledge or skills. Such engagement includes multi-stakeholder dialogues, peace fora or company appraisals. Learning, exchanging information on issues salient in conflict settings, such as governance, revenue transparency, the elimination of conflict diamonds, artisanal mining, or violence against women, and getting to know one another seem to prevail above concrete activities funded by companies in a 'transaction' mode. This type of engagement seems more suitable in conflict settings in that it is meant to build trust and confidence and address issues directly related to conflict. A recent study examining cross-sector collaboration and public-private partnerships in fragile states designed a partnership framework in conflict zones which emphasized the importance of inclusive and flexible engagement for building trust and gaining credibility among communities (Abramov, 2010) . We did not follow the 'transitional' term used by Bowen et al. (2008) for this second type as it suggests that this is an 'in-between'.
The most intensive form of collaboration is what we refer to as transformation, which in some respects resembles what both Austin (2000) and Muthuri et al. (2009) designated as 'integrative', and Bowen et al. (2008) as transformational. However, as our focus is on the societal implications, i.e. possible effects on conflict and community interaction/involvement, and not so much on the impact on the organizations (i.e. whether or not it integrates or is integrated), transformation seems a better characterization than integration.
1 Austin (2000, p. 77) did mention, in relation to his collaboration value construct, that partners could also "come together out of a joint concern about addressing a particular social problem". It is on this approach that we build, with the 'value' to be derived from the collaboration relating to the (co-)creation of a peaceful context from which communities (and/or NGOs representing their interests or working with them) and business can profit. Transformative partnerships have a strong sustainable community development focus, address issues that are highly relevant in conflict settings, and are geared towards building or strengthening communities' capabilities.
It should be noted that our study did not aim to (and could not) assess community impact; in that sense we focus on the intentions of the partners, not so much the outcome.
Measuring the effectiveness of cross-sectoral partnerships is not an easy endeavour (Kolk et al., 2008; Lund-Thomsen, 2009 ) as monitoring and evaluation systems are rarely part of collaboration agreements (Rein and Stott, 2009) , and baseline assessments and consensus about suitable criteria to measure effectiveness are usually lacking (Lund-Thomsen, 2009 , Van Huijstee et al., 2007 . This becomes even more difficult in complex settings, such as those characterized by weak governance and by conflicts, given the high degree of sensitivity of collaboration, the absence of standardized and reliable figures, the lack of formalization, and the different institutional norms (Kolk et al., 2008) . Measuring the impact of partnerships is compounded by so-called attribution problems if partnerships address a web of complex interrelated issues in which other actors are 'intervening' as well, which makes it close to impossible to assess 'causal' relationships. To fully understand projects' (partial) success or failure, the analysis needs to go beyond the traditional input-output-outcome methodology and "incorporate the role of politics and power struggles between different actors in local settings" (Lund-Thomsen, 2009, p.59 ). An examination of the impact of such collaboration is something for future work, but for now, given the dearth of research on this topic, we thought it would be worthwhile to first of all obtain some more insight into what collaborative activities may be found in a conflict setting and how they can be characterized. This is what will be done next. We will offer some reflections on impact in the final section of the paper after our presentation and examination of the findings.
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
In order to explore business-NGO collaboration in a conflict setting, we selected companies operating in the DRC following the criteria used in other research (Kolk and Lenfant, 2009 ).
As comprehensive data(bases) on companies in that context are not easily available, we first looked at those companies appearing in the 2010 largest lists and those mining companies with net assets higher than $200 million. This resulted in only 13 companies, too small a sample to draw conclusions regarding business-NGO collaboration. As smaller companies may also be influential in conflict resolution activities at a local level (cf. Johnson, 2010) , the sample was enlarged by taking two extra criteria into consideration: first, relatively small ('junior') mining companies with minimum net assets of $5 million to account for this relatively important sector with emerging activities; second, companies from other sectors with a minimum annual turnover of $10 million to include those 'middle-range' companies that are not necessary global (such as Mwana Africa, BRC Diamond, African Metals, African
Rainbow Minerals, Africo Resources, JFPI Corp, MAG industries, Aden Services) but with a large regional presence, especially in Africa, and perhaps better local 'knowledge' as well.
This resulted in a sample of 59 companies, of which a majority (n=31 or 52%) operate in the extractive industries (n=6 in oil and gas; n=25 in mining). The remainder was spread over other sectors ranging from banking (n=4), food services (n=4) to telecommunication (n=6). A majority of the companies (64 %) originates from Western/OECD countries, of which 13 (22%) from Canada; all 13 are active in the extractive industries. Interestingly, we found a number of companies from emerging markets (seven from South Africa, three from China, one from India, two from the DRC, and one from Angola). This shows the importance of South-South economic and business linkages (including the emergence of Chinese companies) and a clear presence of South Africa in the African mining sector. For the 59 companies, we collected in the period January-June 2010 the latest available reports and other company information if available, and did an extensive web search. In addition, a questionnaire was sent in both English and French to obtain information on their collaborative activities, to which 15 responded. A more detailed list of companies and sources available is included in Table 1 , which we will discuss in the next section.
In a second step, given that this paper focuses on collaboration between business and NGOs and that obtaining information from the latter perspective would be helpful as well, we identified all international NGOs with a major presence in the DRC. Subsequently semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff involved in partnerships within Search for Common Ground, Pact, Pole, and the Corporate Engagement Project; these NGOs were selected because of their strong orientation on conflict resolution. We also examined other documentation from the NGOs, including annual plans and reports, and information from websites.
The company information was used to explore companies' approaches to conflict (building on Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Oetzel et al., 2007; Wolf et al., 2007) . Furthermore, company information served, together with the data obtained from NGOs as just described, to analyse whether and in what type of partnership activities companies were involved (building on Austin, 2000; Muthuri et al., 2009 ). Table 1 gives an overview of the 59 companies in our sample, and their details as to sector, size of turnover, and country of origin. Moreover, it also shows (in the last two columns) whether the companies have provided information in reports or websites in relation to conflict, and whether they responded to the questionnaire. The Table is sorted according to the categories we identified by building on existing literature on business and conflict (Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2009; Oetzel et al., 2007) : 'avoidant', 'business as usual' and 'conflict resolution'. The first category, 'avoidant', includes companies that neither disclose much information nor answered our questionnaire. Second, 'business as usual' is used for those companies that provide some information, and usually discuss community aspects, but are not specific about the (DRC) conflict setting and keep it generic. Third, 'conflict resolution' involves those companies that communicate / respond and show awareness of the dilemmas of operating in a conflict setting and the possible role of business.
FINDINGS

Overview of companies, their peculiarities and community orientation
Some more details and examples of companies' statements will be given below.
================ Table 1 around here ================ Before moving to that information, it is important to note that the three categories are not 'normative' labels, but are rather meant to assess the extent to which companies take a public position on conflict and their role in it, whether they show awareness of the setting in which they operate, or avoid communicating about it. What companies state publicly is not necessarily what they do in reality; companies can, for example, be active in lobbying or undertake activities that they do not report. However, the latter component, as far as partnering with NGOs is concerned, could have been captured by the fact that we approached NGOs as well. A final caveat is that we, following Jamali and Mershak (2010) , used categories while a continuum might better portray the situation. Despite these limitations, we still found it helpful to give some more insight into how much openness there is amongst companies active in a conflict setting, and to what extent they communicate on / show awareness of its peculiarities. This is a different approach than a purposeful sample amongst a small set of companies that have already shown to be leading in terms of recognition of their role in conflict, as done by, for example, Jamali and Mershak (2010) .
As shown in Table 1 , a large majority of the companies in our sample (n=37 or 63%) falls in the 'business-as-usual' category, 24% (n=14) can be characterised as 'avoidant', while very few (n=8 or 14%) are explicit about conflict resolution. In line with Kolk and Lenfant is open about the fact that there is a natural tension between "community expectations and the level of sustainable benefits which can be delivered by resource companies, but this can be mitigated through a healthy and transparent process of dialogue". More companies refer to consultation with communities and activities carried out in cooperation with community members. A community liaison committee (Rangold), community liaison forum (Engen), or community advisory panels (Freeport) were typically mentioned as being used to share information openly with community constituents, gather input, address areas of mutual concerns and capture communities' priorities to translate them into concrete actions.
Only three companies (Engen, De Beer and Katanga) explicitly stated that their community investment strategies were in support of government priorities, thus addressing criticisms that private actors' intervention in social areas undermine government capacity and are therefore likely to be counterproductive (Ite, 2005) . This issue is even more salient in the DRC context where government authorities, especially in the Eastern provinces, are either absent or not functioning, leaving non-state actors that have a genuine interest in providing social services with a dilemma: waiting for the government to be capable enough to formulate and execute a social plan, or provide services unilaterally or collaboratively, based on needs expressed by the communities themselves or by non-state units acting on their behalf. The type of collaborative activities that can be found in the DRC will be discussed next.
Partnership activities
On the basis of the data collected from and about companies and NGOs, we classified the partnerships' activities in different categories, as explained above: philanthropy, engagement and transformation. Table 2 gives an overview, sorted by company. The second category, 'engagement', turned out to comprise business-NGO collaboration involving transfer of funds (in which NGOs were paid for service delivery with a learning component) and those without it, in which there is only exchange of knowledge and/or skills. Rights Watch, which makes funding-based engagement virtually impossible due to the accusations that these NGOs would face of being co-opted were they to receive funds from companies. Quite some NGOs in this category have an explicit policy not to accept resources from the private sector.
================
Transformative partnerships have a sustainable development community focus, addressing issues that are relevant to conflict settings; they can play a role in helping diminish problems by building/strengthening local capabilities. While limited in number, they also stand out with regard to the position taken by companies. In the partnership between Katanga, Pact and local communities, for example, the company sees its role not only in terms of providing funds but also in taking "a leadership role in developing social development programmes, including facilitating and motivating partners and donors and leveraging thirdparty funds, fostering self-sufficiency, mobilising communities to take responsibility for their own futures". In the Anvil-Pact partnership, which aims at capacity building of village water committees, the transformative aspect originates precisely from the different roles played by 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper aimed to help shed more light on collaborative activities involving companies and NGOs in a conflict setting. While business-NGO partnerships have received much attention in recent years, insights have been obtained from research in 'stable' contexts, not from conflict-ridden countries where such collaboration may be even more crucial in building trust and capacity and in addressing governance problems given the absence of a reliable state. Data was collected from and about companies active in the Democratic Republic of Congo, using both primary and secondary sources (involving companies and NGOs). We analysed the positions taken by companies vis-à-vis the conflict based on their communications and categorised business-NGO partnership activities. While many companies
are not very open about their (potential) role in conflict resolution, others pay attention to community aspects, although frequently not in the specific DRC setting in which they operate. The most 'aware' companies seem to be those originating from Western countries as well as South Africa and active in the extractive industries, with high levels of operational activities. Contributing to economic development and fostering a sense of community are the most typical peace-related activities carried out by those 'aware' companies. There was no evidence of businesses engaging in track two diplomacy or policy dialogue, either unilaterally or collaboratively. In our findings, most companies are compliant, or at best adopt 'do no harm' strategies, while very few pro-actively engage in peace-building activities.
A majority of the partnerships found in this study are philanthropic, and deal with 'traditional' issues such as health, safety, and HIV/Aids in a donor-recipient mode with limited community involvement. There are only a few real transformative partnerships, which address aspects directly related to the conflict, have a community-wide, sustainable community development focus and are characterised by a mix of mutual learning, project implementation, and capacity/institution building. In between these two types, we found socalled 'engagement' collaboration which can be divided into activities including the transfer of funds, and those without it. While the former is mostly oriented at service delivery, the latter seems particularly relevant in the conflict context as well since it is based on knowledge exchange that furthers companies' awareness of conflict-sensitive issues into their operations (i.e. how to deal with rebels and with artisanal miners, how to reduce violence against women) and thus indirectly helps reduce conflict via the organisational route.
This is a type of community development innovation, also visible in transformative partnerships, that may have an impact on how companies deal with conflict. This is something that can be diffused within the organisation as well, impinging on the micro level (internally, between managers and employees and possible other stakeholders (cf. Kolk et al., 2011) ; in the case of MNCs even across locations (Kolk and Van Tulder, 2010) . While it relates to Austin's observation that companies are "seeking new strategies of engagement with their communities that will have greater corporate relevance and higher social impact" (Austin, 2000, p. 70 ) beyond philanthropy, the conflict dimension makes the engagement types that we distinguish somewhat specific and interesting to explore further for its broader existence and applicability. Our paper has sketched different collaboration venues for companies operating in conflict contexts to engage with local communities, in partnership with NGOs, to tackle poverty and conflict-related issues. In that light, it can be argued that transformative partnerships that (in)directly contribute to peace through reducing tensions and fostering a sense of togetherness among local communities are innovative forms of governance that business can promote, or participate in, as part of their corporate innovation strategy. It may also have its (trickle) effects within organizations and infuse new ways of thinking and behaviour on the part of both internal and external stakeholders (Kolk et al., 2011) . Table 3 summarises peculiarities of the different partnership forms distinguished in the paper, considering the type of NGOs that companies collaborate with, the degree to which conflict issues are addressed, the level of community involvement and the domain/focus of activity. As such, our classification in three main categories was inspired by Austin (2000) and Muthuri et al. (2009 ). Muthuri et al. (2009 (Austin, 2000, p. 90) , posits that cross-sector collaboration is meant to develop according to specific drivers and enablers. It should be noted, however, that our findings in a conflict setting seem different. This may be (partly) due to the different geographical peculiarities (US/Western in the case of Austin, DRC in our paper), and political and organisational settings ('peace' and stability versus conflict and low governance). Austin (2000, p. 72 ) also mentioned that "progression along the continuum is not automatic"; however, his addition that "regression can occur" appears more focused on a time-bound evolution than we think to be likely for a conflict setting such as the one we analysed in our paper.
================
We also found a relatively unique partnership type, engagement without funds, which is based on knowledge exchange or mutual learning among lobby/advocacy NGOs and companies. This collaboration form appears to be fairly recent, especially in conflict settings where the relationship was typically hostile and confrontational, as evidenced by the myriad of reports written and campaigns led by the former against the latter. More generally, there seems to be a general shift in engagement strategies from a sectoral point of view. Business and NGOs are more inclined nowadays to interact positively with one another in an African conflict setting, which is a trend also observed in non-conflict settings (e.g. Yaziji and Doh, 2009 ). Learning via partnerships in conflict settings seems less related to the partnering process itself than to the issues and the context in which both companies and NGOs operate.
Still, this is something that deserves further research, given that our study and sample was limited, not only in numbers but also in its focus on just one conflict country. In this regard, it is notable that even though our findings indicate that engagement without funds is not necessarily suitable for evolving into a more integrated, or transformative partnership, one case (the Care-Banro partnership) developed from the engagement into the transformative type. In that specific instance, engagement served both the company (Banro) and the NGO (Care), which shared an interest in contributing to peaceful societies and sustainable community development, to get to know each other before committing to a transformative partnership. The community needs assessment conducted by Care led to the design of a community-based development programme for the next 10 years in partnership with the company. Hence, while our study helps to provide more insight into the role of business-NGO collaboration, follow-up research is necessary, also in other settings and with broader sets of companies and partners. Investigation of the actual impact on communities needs further attention as well, as this was beyond the scope of this paper. In the cases that we examined, we found no evidence of objective, independent evaluations of the partnerships. There was no systematic assessment of partnership benefits (and goals being attained) at company, NGO, community or issue levels. We did not specifically ask to review partnership contractual agreements where goal-setting and the definition of verifiable indicators on how to measure progress would typically be mentioned, but evidence that these existed at all is lacking as well. In some cases, such as engagement without funds, it is very likely that no formal agreement has been set on paper with clear goals and indicators since this collaboration type is more akin to a process or a dialogue platform where learning takes place. While in most cases, partnership objectives or goals were formulated, we found very little data concerning indicators (with the exception of the Anvil-Pact partnership).
At the company level, we found the following information. AngloAmerican and De
Beer use a socio-economic impact assessment toolbox for all of their community supporting initiatives. Katanga's programs and investments have been developed through a data-driven, risk management framework. BHP-Billiton touches upon the necessity to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of their community investment programs and Metorex reports "continually improving community development and community investment programs through monitoring, measuring and managing our social and economic impacts".
Nevertheless, these companies did not provide much details about their monitoring and evaluation methodologies. For those partnerships that were completed at the time of the writing, in most cases, some information was available on whether the immediate goals were attained or not: for example, 85 km of roads have been repaired (AAA-AGA), training sessions have been provided (Freeport-Pact), medicines have been distributed (KatangaCure), the conflict assessment has been done (CEP-Anvil), and consultations have been held (AGA-Pole). Typically, the information provided is at output level. Only in a handful of cases could we find information on outcome, such as villagers' access to local markets to sell their products or buy inputs (AAA, AGA), which led to a cost reduction and an improvement in their economic situation. What is systematically missing however, is information on outcome and impact, especially at the issue level: medicines were distributed, but there is no information whether this had an impact on decrease in mortality rates.
In development policy circles, evaluation methodologies typically use efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability as criteria to assess program impact. In the cases analysed in this paper, with regard to efficiency, little cost information was provided, which makes it difficult to make a cost-benefit analysis. Concerning effectiveness, goals were met at the output level, regardless of the type of partnership. The preference for transformative partnerships that emerges from this paper is based on relevance and sustainability rather than on effectiveness. Relevance refers to the extent to which the (planned) effects of the activities carried out within the partnerships contribute to the realization of the broader (developmental) goal, or impact. Philanthropic partnerships can be highly effective in meeting their goals at output level, without having a broader positive impact or bringing about positive changes in the broader conflict context. Other partnership studies also recommend taking the broader (development) context into account (Ashman, 2001; Kolk et al., 2008) .
What this paper argues is that, despite its lack of verifiable indicators that would give an objective measurement of the effectiveness of the collaboration arrangements under scrutiny, in complex settings such as those in the DRC, transformative partnerships are best equipped to tackle root causes of conflict and bring about positive and sustainable change, thus ultimately serving the cause of peace. In the Central African context, collaboration agreements that do not take into account the conflict context, or do not address conflictrelated issues such as ethnicity, identity, land, power and natural resources are less likely to be relevant or sustainable. Transformative partnerships are not constructed in a vacuum and aim at finding lasting solutions to problems directly related to conflict, whereas philanthropic partnerships are often 'one off', generic activities with no or little link to the (broader) conflict context.
Despite the limitations of our exploratory study, it can be said that partnership activities appear to have a clear potential in contributing to conflict reduction or resolution in regions where governance and institutional structures are in flux, and trust is low. This adds another dimension to the role of business in conflict countries, which has received increasing attention in recent years (e.g. Jamali and Mirshak, 2010; Kolk and Lenfant, 2009; Oetzel et al., 2007) , as it helps to extend and involve a broader set of actors, that may together leverage more 'resources' for peace. While just one of the many steps needed, it may be a valuable contribution.
NOTES
1 Likewise, while using 'transformation' as a noun, as adjective we do not use transformational but instead transformative, given that we focus much more on the process rather than the direct outcomes. 
